

EU Today Podcast 2 Transcript

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[Intro music in theme of piano playing Ode to Joy]

Katie Lindner: Hello, and welcome to EU Today, a podcast from the Center for European studies, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Thank you to the Erasmus+ program of the European Commission, the EU Delegation to the U.S., and the U.S. Department of Education for supporting our center and its programs. On this podcast, we sit down with scholars and policy leaders to discuss pressing issues facing the EU. We hope you enjoy it.

On this podcast, we will be interviewing professors Jennifer Fitzgerald and Marc Helbling. They visited UNC-Chapel Hill to participate in a panel entitled "The Political Divides that are Transforming the EU" on March 20, 2019. The panel was organized by, and also featured, UNC Professor Rahsaan Maxwell, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence key faculty member. Jennifer Fitzgerald is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Colorado- Boulder. A specialist in comparative political behavior, much of Fitzgerald's work examines the ways in which social context shapes political attitudes and vote choice in advanced democratic societies. Marc Helbling is Full Professor in political sociology at the department of political science at the University of Bamberg and a research fellow at the WZB, the Berlin Social Science Center. He works on immigration and citizenship policies, nationalism, national identities, xenophobia and islamophobia, and right-wing populism. Interviewing professors Fitzgerald and Helbling, is Stephanie Shady, a PhD candidate here at UNC in political science.

[Ode to Joy fades back in and plays for appx. 4 measures]

Stephanie Shady: Great! So, Today we have with us professors Jennifer Fitzgerald and Marc Helbling, and they're here to talk with us today about immigration and different ideological and social factors that are happening in Europe across different countries. For both of you, thank so much, and there are a variety of terms out there that are trying to get at how we describe these political parties that we are seeing in Europe today: far-right, radical right, nationalist, populist anti-immigrant, all of these

different terms. So, what do you think is the most accurate way to characterize these parties, and why would you pick one term versus the other?

Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald: So, when I look at this list of terms: far-right, radical right, nationalist, populist, and anti-immigrant—I think we could even add in there extreme right, it often gets lumped in—my viewpoint is that in a lot of ways they're all really pointing at the same parties empirically. That if you had a Venn diagram of all those different terms, it would really look like one big circle with a few little bumps on the edges. Though, one thing that stands out to me is the populist term, because as what we now think of as a thing ideology, it can transcend left to right—it doesn't necessarily have to be located on either side of the political spectrum—with the overall sort of rhetoric being one of the pure people versus these corrupt elites who are illegitimate, who don't represent us, that this isn't real democracy is the way that a lot of populist politicians put it. So, you can imagine, that you can fit that on the left, you can fit that on the right, so just as much as we see parties that are populist radical right, populist far right, there are also parties like The Left in Germany, The Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Podemos in Spain, that have often been characterized as populist left. To me, that's just the one that stands out as just a little bit off, but the other ones in many ways are very similar. Maybe another distinction would be between the radical right and the extreme right. Lately we've been talking about them in terms of the extreme right being more directly critical of democracy, a little more extreme, maybe open to some sort of pseudo-fascist, neo-fascist kind of a state, whereas the radical right seems relatively content with democracy, but wants to change things, and probably challenge some of the more liberal, European liberal, dimensions of it.

Stephanie Shady: Yeah, so are you working within the preexisting democratic system, or trying to subvert that system? Definitely.

I just wanted to pick up on something you said about the populist parties, and how that can be maybe not so much a party type as it is a strategy that different parties might use.

And Marc, did you want to add something to that?

Professor Marc Helbling: I agree with everything Jennifer has just said. The problem with populism, populist, also may be that it's nowadays used for, basically, each time a politician or party does something weird or strange, it's called populism. So basically, everything seems to be populism, and we should be very careful with this term because there's a clear concept or definition behind it, so we should be careful. Also, maybe what is also important or maybe different with regard to the other terms, is to some extent that it's not about far-left or far-right populism, more and more people are actually sure that every party, to some extent, is populist, and that's the difficulty behind this concept—it's not just either or, it's more about more or

less, and that can be more or less on the left side, but all the parties are also populist to some extent. And in that regard, it's clearly based on a different level than all those other terms you just mentioned.

Stephanie Shady: Definitely. So, do you think that its acceptable to use these terms interchangeably then, besides the populist term? Do you think empirically, its practically useful for us to use any of these terms, or do you favor one or the other in your own writing?

Professor Helbling: Well, personally, the term I use most often is right-wing populist parties, or left-wing populist parties, because sometimes I am not really sure what radical really means especially in comparison to extremist parties, because extremist parties are clearly different because they are clearly opposed to the idea of democracy in general, whereas populist parties just fight against liberal forms of democracies, so in that regard its really different. And then radical, sometimes I'm not really sure whether people use that as a synonym for extremist or not, sometimes its rather useful to say far-right populist parties, but I think it's a matter of definition—if you are provide a definition when you're writing, it should be clear.

Stephanie Shady: Absolutely, it's sort of a question of radical relative to what you think personally. So across political science and social science disciplines there's been a lot of discussion of about potential realignments of the European party system, that there's something fundamentally different happening, where these traditional center-left, center-right parties are at least losing vote share if not losing power actually in government. So, clearly there's going to be institutional factors at play [i.e.] is it a multi-party system, how does the electoral system translate votes into seat share? But all of us today on this podcast are more political-behavior oriented and thinking about that side of the story too. So, there are clearly costs for voters to learn about new parties or movements, and be aware of them, understand what they are, and then to make that jump, to actually switch a party preference. Or maybe they've never voted before, and now this party is incentivizing them to vote for the first time. Thinking about the individual voter level, what does it take to actually motivate an individual to get out and vote for these new parties? Are there any factors that you think are really important, or ones that might get overplayed in media accounts that you want to dispel the myth [of]?

Professor Helbling: Well there may be two factors that are really important when it comes to these parties. One is more about dissatisfaction with other parties and the system and politics in general. Also, in that regard, the costs are very low because many people do not vote for these parties because they agree with their ideologies, I mean, some do, but others just do it to protest against the system, against other

parties. For those people, there's very limited costs because they basically just want to have something else, or show the other parties that they don't like them. But on the other hand, the second reason that these parties are successful in my view is that they do represent certain views that are not represented by other parties, especially when it comes to these aspects that we mentioned before: nationalism, immigration issues. So those are normally the only parties openly opposed to all these things, and people care very much about migration, national borders, state sovereignty. So, it's basically the only option they have is to vote for these parties. And I think that the second [factor]. So, there's an ideology part, and then a sort of strategic protest voting that leads to the success of these parties I would say.

Professor Fitzgerald: Yeah, if you approach it from the point of view of stock voting literature, right, what we know about why people vote for the parties that they vote for, there are two ways a that a party can appeal to someone, two main ways. One is how it makes them feel, and the other is the policy positions that they're advocating, and I think these parties do both of those things really quite effectively, sometimes for different audiences. And one of the things I've noticed and that I've read a fair amount about in other people's work, is that people who feel alienated, who feel left out, who think "leaders, most political parties don't care about people like me" and you can define that in all different kinds of ways that are more or less suited to democracy, but there's something very powerful about the appeals and the rhetoric and the way that they invite people in and try to make them feel a part of something, and then there are other policy prescriptions, and I think that people vote for these parties for both of those reasons. And the other thing I was thinking—I like your question about thinking about information and "how do you learn enough about one of these parties?" Something that I discovered in my research several years ago, in looking at Swiss families in particular, is that to the extent to which we can pull apart communication within families, and intergenerational influence, I found evidence that tells us that young people talking to their parents, convinces their parents to think about voting for these parties. And not just on the radical right, or the far-right, but also with respect to the Greens. So, you have this reverse transmission effect, where young people are picking up on the buzz—maybe they're on social media, maybe they're hearing about it at school from their friends—and they're communicating with their parents, and their parents are actually in some cases, listening. Usually, we think about traditional political socialization, which is your parents tell you which parties to support, and that tends to be really effective for maintaining stability over time. These are the parties that existed 20-30 years ago, and these are the parties that are going to keep existing, because parents are sending this channel of influence downward. And there's some evidence that says that, in fact, we see a reverse effect, and that's destabilizing, to your question about these mainstream parties losing support. And I think there's something really interesting there, that is critical to understand about youth politics in particular.

Stephanie Shady: That's so interesting! That makes me inspired to try to convince my parents to vote my way! But I can definitely see that generational change, the unidirectional change is more stable.

So, what about characteristics of individual voters? Both of you mentioned tapping into policy preferences that might not be represented in the existing parties, and also tapping into emotional appeals for people who are feeling left out. We hear this typical story of the blue collar, rural, manual laborer being the typical voter for some of these parties. Are there groups that we're not thinking about in these typical narratives we hear that we should also consider when we're thinking about voting for these parties?

Professor Fitzgerald: I think one of the great things about using survey data, for instance, to understand the rise of parties, or of these voting behaviors more broadly, one of the great things is that we get a really powerful profile of the most likely voter, and that's very useful. It helps us understand some of the motivations behind it. However, when we're using models of central tendency, we tend to focus on the variables that are the most significant, and we lead with this profile, and then we stop and say, "well hold on, that's just the most likely voter, but there are other people who fit totally different descriptions who are voting for these parties". And to me there's something really interesting there, it's just a little harder to get at. For instance, women tend not to support far-right parties, for instance right wing populist parties, and I think we gloss over some of that diversity when we just look to see "ok, who's the most likely profile". And I think that there's some fascinating work that can be done, and in my own work, I have found that there are different ways that people make their way to their parties. One of the mechanisms that I identified—we can talk about this more later, I'll talk about it this afternoon—has to do with local attachments, and how people feel about their communities. It turns out that women are more likely to use their community ties and membership as a point of departure for supporting one of these parties, whereas men tend to be more nationally focused. And I think that there's a great amount of diversity that we haven't even really gotten to yet.

Stephanie Shady: Yeah, it's so interesting now that we're starting to see more within-country studies, that there's so much variation that we've been missing by thinking of this country as more pro or anti-immigrant, and now there's just so much more variation we can learn about.

Professor Helbling: But I think, to take this to another level, the community plays an important role for certain people, be it the local community, or more generally, the general argument would be that the national community has an important role. An important characteristic, or the terms that we also often use is "winners and losers of

globalization". So, the people who are, or at least think—and that's interesting but it's actually true—if they just think that are not in a position to take advantage of globalization, or the lowering of national boundaries, and all these things and have the impression that they are as the terms says, the losers of this development, versus the winners. This is also very much about the community, and how important is the community at the national level, this time, but still, it would extend to whether or not people are actually taking advantage of a globalized world or not. I think that's also quite crucial here.

Stephanie Shady: Definitely, and it's also interesting to think about how tangible or visible their connection to globalization is, and whether or not, as you said, they really are winners or losers of globalization, it's the perception that matters, and perhaps also what kind of information the parties—what kind of narrative—they're telling them about being a winner or a loser.

We're talking a lot about how these parties are sort of new, and potentially changing the system, but some of these parties have actually existed for a while: These radical or far-, nationalist right parties. For instance, Jennifer eve talked about some research in France where the former Front National, now the Rassemblement National, has been competing in politics since the 1970s. But today, we've observed a number of these parties proliferating and increasing their vote share. And maybe they existed before, but more in the shadows. So, what's the difference today versus 40 or 50 years ago? How is it that so many of these parties are able to enter competition with greater ease than before, or have the voters changed in their preferences for these parties over time?

Professor Fitzgerald: So, I haven't studied that parties as much as I wish I had, but I would say one of the things that has changed so much—if we think of the National front, now the National Rally on France—for instance, has to do with refinement. Refinement of the message and taming it a bit so that it is not so outrageously offensive. Just if you listen closely enough, you can pick up on certain kinds of cues, but a lot of the harshest rhetoric has been set aside or at the very least isn't put into manifestoes, the party manifestos, at the very least isn't made on the big stage in the big speeches and the campaigns. To me I think there's been a more carefully crafted message to at least appear more mainstream—closer to mainstream anyway. And the anti-establishment message I think has gotten sharper and in large measure it has been aided by the fact that the EU simply grown and increased in its authority. For people who are looking to inflate nationalist feelings, the EU is just a wonderful foil that simply didn't exist--well it existed, but not in the version we have today in that it wasn't so robust—in the earlier eras of these parties. And so, I'd say that they've been aided in certain respects in that they have this faraway, technocratic, confusing bureaucracy that is making decision that influence them,

and so they've been able to, I would say, really refine that message too, when it comes to these elites. "It's not just national elites, it's elites somewhere else, elites in Brussels! Egads!"

Professor Helbling: I think the same is true for immigration and other related. So, all these globalization issues, immigration, EU, economic globalization, somehow became more important over the last 20-30 years, became more important issue. And the other part, as you've mentioned already, is that these parties also changed strategies, and in very different ways. I think each party is somehow different in that regard. The Front National maybe didn't really change that much its profile that much, content-wise, but it more their strategies, but if you take another example like the swiss people's party, which also is a very interesting case in that regard that it existed for a long time as a rather big party, but it had a completely different profile – it was like a classic conservative party that represented rural interests and things like that, and then in the context of the EU, it started to change its profile and became more anti-EU, anti-immigration party. There're still factions within the party nowadays, so it's not like that classic typical right-wing populist party because there's still this more conservative, more traditional faction in this party still. In yet other cases, like Germany for example, these aspects were covered by the moderate right-wing parties, like the CDU for example in Germany, and the CSU. They somehow covered all these topics and positions, and then, at some point, they moved to the center, and basically this space opened for other parties, and that's part of the explanation for why we have the AfD nowadays. So that's another typical pattern that we sometimes observe in some countries.

Stephanie Shady: Definitely, the theme of opportunism in light of new events coming in or new opportunities with the party space that exists. I know this afternoon, you will be talking more about communities in particular, and how that plays into this story, because, of course, these individual voters don't live in vacuums, they don't develop political attitudes completely on their own. They live in communities, they live in overlapping social groups that provide influence. So, what are some of the key ways that these group memberships and communal identities are helping shape these political preferences?

Professor Fitzgerald: This notion of multiple overlapping group memberships or group affinities is something that is so obviously an accurate depiction of society from a ground level, you know, "I'm walking around as a person, this is obviously how people think of themselves, how they operate," and it seems to be disconnected in some respects from the way that I would say academics tend to think about society when they're looking at it from maybe a more aggregated perspective. We [academics] think "ok, the cleavages are our class, and the cleavages are maybe race and ethnicity" and we have these lines that we draw

when we think about society, but it doesn't always match the way that people are conceptualizing themselves, but I think where we can find common ground between this more pedestrian understanding of human electoral behavior, and this more overarching framework, is that those multiple overlapping identifications and group memberships somehow have to become politicized in order to matter for electoral behavior. And that doesn't always happen. It doesn't necessarily mean that just because someone is a mom doesn't mean that they identify with moms, and that that's going to affect their political behavior. Just because someone is engaged in a particular industry it doesn't necessarily mean that they identify with those other people and that that would matter for their political participation. So, to me I think where we could do in our research is to have a better understanding of the conditions under which certain attachments become relevant for politics. And I think what has with far-right groups in particular, radical right populist groups, is that they have opened the door to a proliferation of identities mattering in politics. You know you hear this term identity politics so much. I don't know what that means, but I think that the connective tissue there has to be politicization or political salience for why those things matter, and in certain conditions, in certain case with certain parties, they're just picking up on some of those cues that are deeply salient to people, but maybe hadn't been politically relevant before.

Stephanie Shady: Definitely, that's so interesting, I was just thinking, in almost every survey we conduct, we are told "you control for education, gender, race, whatever," but we don't really understand the extent to which one person [s behavior is affected by that]. Maybe they say "check, I'm a woman" on a survey, but does that mean anything to them? Or how does it interact with their race in something that's more blurry and complicated than an interaction term in a regression model. I was just thinking, one of my students—I teach an undergraduate immigration class here—and she moved here from India with her parents when she was very, very young. She mentioned in class the other day that she never really thought of herself as an immigrant, she didn't use the term to describe herself until the last couple of years with the recent election in the U.S., that that wasn't an identity she felt like she had to stand up for, and make relevant, and now she does. And I thought that was really interesting and highlights what you just said about this sort of salience to people, [and its] political relevance.

Professor Fitzgerald: And I think, just to add on, that online communities have made it easier for people to connect with others that they may have things in common with that they may not routinely interact with, and so that has shifted the way that people can think about who they are relative to broader groups in society.

Professor Helbling: And this also may be one of the reasons that we maybe don't know maybe that much about this is that it's also difficult to measure, its

methodological, so quite challenging. We do this normally in surveys with national identity—that's like a typical thing that we know how to measure, or think that we know how to measure, with the questions, you know, "how much do you identify with your nation" and things like that. That also will be part of my talk this afternoon—can you apply the same instruments to other identities [i.e.] gender identity, social identity. How can you actually measure class consciousness? I mean, that can be quite tricky, and I think we need more methodological debates on this issue.

Maybe also, speaking of salience, you can make the same argument with specific issue positions like xenophobia for example. So, it's often argued that nowadays people became more xenophobic, that's why these parties are so successful. I would say that they are not more xenophobic, it just became more salient. And some surveys show that the percentage of people who don't like immigrants has remained relatively stable over the last decades, but it was just not important to them when it came to party voting or other things. It has become more salient through the parties, through the fact that there are more immigrants, and I think that salience is also a crucial aspect when it comes to specific issues.

Stephanie Shady: Definitely. Unfortunately, it seems like some of the most interesting questions elude us with the data we have so far. So hopefully we can continue collecting things to help us answer those questions. You just mentioned immigration and how that salience has increased over time. So, this has been one of the big parts of the story for this rise of nationalist parties across Europe. So, both of you have written extensively about immigrant integration, attitudes toward immigrants across Western Europe—what can we learn by comparing migration policies at the country level across different countries or local communities within a single country to understand how those policies are helping shape citizens' view of immigrants and potentially respond by voting for these parties?

Professor Helbling: Interestingly, this is a question we ask in a project which we are just about to start: how do policies inform or shape individual opinions on migration, because we really don't know that much about it. There's some research that shows where they have a more multicultural policy people will also be thinking a more multicultural way, so there's some evidence there, but there's not a lot we know actually about the exact mechanisms of what happens when a country introduces more restrictive policy—does that also change opinions or also party preferences? So, I don't think we know that much about it. But in general, I'd say it does matter. It could be considered as part of the national culture or political culture; the way certain things are regulated and how politicians talk about it. I think that informs people and shapes their opinion. Of course, then there's also a little bit of

methodological correlation then because obviously, you know, those institutions do not fall from heaven, you know, they're part of the end of a political process, that involves different opinions. But there is at least some correlation between how things are regulated and how people think about it. And in that regard, we actually do have some evidence also, on the way party rhetoric, or politicians' rhetoric, affects individual opinions, and it makes certain arguments more acceptable. For example, if there are a lot of politicians who oppose immigration and say bad things about immigrants, it makes those kinds of arguments more acceptable in daily life, to talk in a specific way about immigrants. So, I think there's also that effect.

Stephanie Shady: Yeah, well it will be interesting to see how that research continues to play out. It's sort of that classic question: are people leading the policies or are policies influencing people? Looking forward to seeing how that turns out.

Related, but not quite perfectly to policy preferences toward immigration, are preferences toward European integration and membership in the EU, and how much authority we should have at that EU level versus the national level. Particularly with regards to controls of national borders. So, obviously, this week there's been quite a lot of news about the Brexit referendum, and whether or not March 29th is still the official exit date, and in survey data after that referendum, we saw that immigration concerns was one of the primary things that people mentioned, and why they wanted to leave the EU. So as the EU continues to wrestle with these kinds of questions about managing migration effectively but also respecting state sovereignty and assuaging concerns of the public, what are some key challenges or opportunities that the EU and the member states specifically will have to overcome and think about?

Professor Fitzgerald: So, my sense is that you definitely can't avoid the immigration attitudes component of a lot of the surveys you're describing. I don't want to dismiss them, because I know that's a substantial part of the story with respect to Brexit and peoples' ideas more broadly about European integration, but my sense is that it actually-- in a lot of cases for a lot of people --comes from a place of wanting more control rather than specific to the immigration issue. Meaning that the EU again, is seen as so far away, is seen as something that limits the sovereignty of the nation, of the state, of the community. That somehow, power is so far away and that, yes, maybe you're unhappy with immigration policy as it is, or maybe you don't like immigrants, or whatever it is, but a piece of that is "**and** we don't have any say over it." A piece of it is that the decisions are being made farther from home than people are comfortable with. And so, to me when I think about some of the Brexit, I picture people wanting to hunker down and take more control over their lives, and that's politically oriented, but I think there's a component of it that is just a part of our society today that people just don't feel like they have autonomy. They don't feel

like they have control over things. They feel a little uneasy about the world. Again, there's absolutely a prism through which people are judging immigrants harshly, or are intolerant, like I don't want to say that it's not there, but I think a lot of it just comes from a place of just dislocation and confusion, and a feeling that they don't have any control. And the EU is the ultimate manifestation of a faraway locus of control that they think is affecting their lives adversely.

Stephanie Shady: So it's like immigration policy is just one of many policies that they might have wanted control for, and it was just the most salient issue perhaps at the same time that they were taking the survey.

Professor Fitzgerald: Possibly. I haven't looked at it carefully enough but that's my sense.

Professor Helbling: It is a big challenge, because as we have seen over the last years of the so-called, asylum crisis, I think we clearly need more coordination that the European level, but at the same time we also know that immigration is one of the least Europeanized policy fears. For good reason, I will say, because this directly speaks to the question of state sovereignty, and states want to be in control of who's becoming a member of this country, who's coming in. And so, giving up those rights is quite crucial, although, as I said, I think it is important to have more coordination at the EU level. So, I think this will clearly lead to a lot of opposition if there's more people, politicians, parties start to give away immigration rights to the EU or if the EU has to coordinate more, then this will lead to a lot of opposition. Having said that, one of the maybe only good things about Brexit is that I think it has become such a big mess that any other country or party that had it in mind maybe also to leave the EU, now gave up this idea. So, I don't think that well have another Brexit in another country any time soon.

Stephanie Shady: Well, you certainly don't want other the party in power having to deal with the negotiations of it, for sure. Great, thank you. Are there any other final thoughts that you'd like to share with our listeners? Any key points that you think we missed, or that you want to share?

Professor Fitzgerald: I thought it might be interesting to just touch on, and I'd love to hear what Marc has to say, I'd love to hear what you have to say Stephanie, about the implications of far-right voting. What has it done policy wise, what has it done in terms of people's attitudes? I was thinking about some of the panel data that we have where people get interviewed repeatedly over time, and you can chart the way that their attitudes might shift over time. It looks like people who support, I'll go with populist right-wing party, over time tend to become more anti-immigrant, over time tend actually start to trust the institutions of their government less. They also

become more interested in politics. So you have more people who are becoming frustrated or rabid about immigration, more engaged in politics, but also having stronger anti-system views. And to me I just think there's something really important, about understanding, not just why people vote for them, but once they do, once they decide to support them, how does this change the way that they're viewing politics? And so, it's something I just wanted to get on the table. I'd love to hear what you guys think about the implications of these parties.

Stephanie Shady: One thing I was thinking about with political engagement, not only of the voters of these right-wing populist parties themselves, but just of everyone. I feel like in the last 3 years I've become highly aware of a bunch of bureaus and offices and positions in my country's government that I didn't even think about on a daily basis, or I didn't know the leaders or their names, so maybe it's encouraging people to scrutinize who is actually running things in our government institutions. But I was also thinking about – you mentioned that they are more engaged in politics—but it's maybe a question of what kind of quality engagement are we seeing? So are they willing to take a government at its word, if it is their party or preferred candidate in power, and will that change if they are no longer in power in the future. And I think that's an open question perhaps. I'm not sure I have a solid answer for what direction I think that will go, but I think it might be potentially dangerous if we think about the source of information and people's willingness to not update their preferences based on the incoming information.

Professor Helbling: And maybe related to this is the danger, at least my fear, that all these new parties or party rhetoric leads to more polarization. So maybe more engagement, but also more polarization? The good thing about these parties is that they certainly brought in some new perspectives some new ideas on how to run a country, you can disagree or agree with that, but there's a reason that these parties became successful, because people were clearly dissatisfied. And we have to take this seriously of course, and there are some new perspectives, so that's maybe the good things about it, but the bad thing is that it clearly leads to more fights, less civilized debates, more opposition, more polarization, and that people don't actually talk to each other anymore. And that will be part of our discussion, or at least of my talk today, that people then start to avoid each other in even in daily life, and they don't talk to each other anymore, even if they're more engaged in politics, so I think that's clearly a danger we face.

Stephanie Shady: Yeah, it's definitely become more personal it's not just "oh, we agree to disagree", it's like, "what values are underpinning our disagreements, and does that mean we're incompatible as friends or colleagues" or something like that, and that can be definitely concerning for democracy, but it's challenging as a faulted human to be the one to start those conversations across different parties.

Did you have anything you wanted to add?

Well, thanks you both so much for talking to me, and I'm really looking forward to your panel tonight!

[Ode to joy plays in the background]

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[Ode to Joy fades out]

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